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Abstract 
In this paper we use template analysis to study the content of privacy policies both of online social 
networks as well as 3rd party application providers. After analysing and prioritising the topics 
mentioned in these policies, we discuss potential problems, limitations of privacy policies, and the 
responsibilities they assign to various stakeholders. These findings will, in future work serve as 
stakeholder input for aligning social networking sites’ privacy definitions, concerns, and practices. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Social networking services (SNS) continue to expand; both in terms of the number of users they have, 
and the number and scope of integration with other social web applications (Third Party Applications). 
SNS also remain a very interesting application domain for understanding changing privacy concerns, 
practices and conflicting definitions from the perspective of different stakeholders.  
Most popular SNS and Third Party Applications (TPA) provide privacy policies to address some of 
these privacy concerns and practices. Privacy policies are legally binding and socially constructed 
documents (non-human objects) and play an important role in defining the roles and responsibilities of 
the involved stakeholders. Documents such as privacy policies can be interesting for researchers since  
they are actively and collectively produced, exchanged and consumed; indicate many decisions by 
many people; reflect special social circumstances; and, lastly, since their consumption is a social 
process, governing who will use which documents for what purposes (Miller & Alvarado 2005). 
The main objective of this paper is to analyze privacy policies to prioritize the privacy concerns of the 
SNS and TPA providers and the privacy practices they offer to the different stakeholders. In order to 
fulfil this objective, we decided to conduct a qualitative study of the privacy policies of social 
networks. Using a qualitative method, we expect to identify topics of interest, regardless of how, or 
how often, they are addressed. Our objective is to study the privacy concerns of SNS providers with 
respect to users and other stakeholders, to understand how these topics are related to each other in the 
documents, and to study the construction of the different roles, responsibilities and accountabilities 
assigned to the different stakeholders. Hence, we selected template analysis to study privacy policies. 
Based on this method we systematically coded the privacy policies and posed the following questions: 
 
• How is privacy defined in the privacy policies of SNS and TPAs? Is it limited to the descriptions in 
various data protection principles or do the policies extend those principles and/or offer alternatives 
where data protection has its shortcomings? 
• Which issues are relevant and important for the SNS and TPAs with respect to their users’ privacy? 
Which issues do the play down? What kind of accountability and liability do they offer or assign to 
their users or third parties with respect to the information they manage? 
• Which concerns do providers specifically articulate with respect to third parties and users' personal 
information? Which stakeholders are identified as responsible for addressing these concerns? And, 
how is the situation framed from the perspective of third parties? 
We chose Facebook, Myspace and Orkut as the SNS of interest for a variety of reasons. Facebook is 
currently the largest SNS and has had its fair share of privacy issues over the years. It also recently 
adopted a “democratic” approach to updating its Terms of Use and Privacy Policies. Myspace was the 
largest SNS for a long time and targets a different audience from Facebook, including musicians and 
artists. Orkut is heavily present in the Brazilian and Indian market and is a Google-owned company. 
Google itself has been the focus of a series of privacy related critiques. Additionally, we chose two of 
the largest 3rd party application providers, Zynga and Playfish, whose products include many of the 
most popular games on SNS. Zynga is based in California, and Playfish in the UK. The different 
locations are also interesting since they reflect the different data protection laws the companies comply 
with. 
Due to space limitations, we will focus on passages and statements that stand out in the 
aforementioned policies. We also shortly present an overview of the themes (codes) derived from our 
analysis. Comprehensive analyses and comparisons of all the policies can be found in a technical 
report we have produced on this topic (Guerses and Rizk 2010). The same technical report also 
includes a mapping of a previous study on user privacy concerns with respect to SNS based on another 
set of documents: news and the blogosphere (Rizk et al. 2009). There we also analyze if the concerns 
raised by the different stakeholders in these documents are matched or addressed by the privacy 
policies, or not. 
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents related work in the areas of 
SNS and privacy policies and describes template analysis. Section 3 discusses the analysis of the 
privacy policies of SNS providers and presents the main codes or themes identified therein. Section 4 
presents the same analysis for TPA providers. Finally, Section 6 discusses the results and concludes 
this paper. 
2 RELATED WORK, METHODOLOGY AND DOCUMENTATION 
SNS and TPA privacy policies are by-products of legislation or national recommendations of data 
protection principles applied to the collection, processing and distribution of personal information. In 
the USA, the Federal Trade Commission recommends the Fair Information Practices (2007), which 
are enforced through self-regulation, private remedies and government enforcement. All data 
collection processing in continental Europe is subject to the Regulation (EC)No 45/2001 (2000), 
whereas in the U.K. this is regulated by the Data Protection Act (1998).  
In our analysis, we mention the principles and legislation that the privacy policies in our data set 
explicitly claim to address. Nevertheless, our concern is not to study which information practices or 
data protection principles are applied or legislation is complied with, as in the recent survey by Reay 
& Dick & Miller (2009). Instead, we study how these principles are interpreted and communicated in 
the privacy policies, which ones are emphasized, and which others are left rather nebulous.  
We used template analysis to systematically study the privacy policies. Template analysis is similar to 
thematic analysis in that it is used to thematically organize and analyse textual data. The essence of 
template analysis is that the researcher produces a list of codes ('template') representing themes 
identified in their textual data. The template is most commonly organized in a hierarchical structure, 
representing the relationships between the themes (King 2004). Template analysis can be used within 
a range of epistemological positions: anywhere between the positivistic position of quantitative 
analysis "discovering" underlying causes of human action, to the 'contextual contructivist' position 
which assumes that there may be many interpretations depending on the researcher and the context of 
the research (King 2004).  
In this study, we subscribe to the second school of thought. Quantitative and experimental studies of 
privacy policies exist. These studies are concerned with the automation of privacy policies using 
machine-readable solutions (Reeder & Kelley & McDonald & Cranor 2009), semi-structured language 
analysis to extract privacy requirements from privacy policies (Breaux and Anton 2005), usability and 
readability of privacy policies (McDonald & Reeder & Kelley & Cranor 2009), and presentation and 
visualization of privacy policies (Kelley 2009).  
While quantitatively analysing the codes, or even the vocabulary and grammar of the privacy policies, 
reveals interesting starting points for studies, we assume that the frequency of code may not tell us 
everything meaningful about the semantics of and relationships between textual data. Sometimes a 
topic mentioned may make an important difference in the analysis of a privacy policy regardless of the 
frequency of its mention. As stated on the homepage of the Template Analysis Method: "The fact that 
a theme is particularly common – or rare – may point to something worth closer attention, but in 
qualitative analysis it must never be taken as any kind of "evidence" in and of itself. The process of 
listing themes is about raising questions, not answering them." (Template Analysis 2009)  
Further, usability and readability studies focus on the comprehension and transparency of these 
policies. If privacy policies are to serve any purpose, then the their transparency and usability are 
central. Yet, making the policies transparent is a different concern then the need for a deeper analysis 
as to how the policies construct or order the relationship between users and service providers, service 
providers and third parties, and between users. We are unaware of any studies that move beyond 
matters of legal compliance and usability that also investigate the construction of roles, responsibilities 
and accountabilities in privacy policies in a comparable manner. 
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According to the template analysis method, a first version of the template is either pre-defined or 
established through some initial coding. A code is a label attached to a section of text, to index it as 
relating to a theme or issue in the data, which the researcher has identified as important to her 
interpretation (King 04). The hierarchical organization of codes enables the researcher to analyze the 
data at varying levels of detail: higher-order codes can give an overview, while lower-order codes 
allow for fine distinctions to be made both within and among specific cases. 
We followed the template analysis process in developing our template (based on an initial first run 
through the Facebook Privacy Policy, later developed by applying it to the full data set). We expected 
the main data protection principles to be present, but did not define a priori themes in order to avoid 
bias. Our data set contained only privacy policies of the subjects, but we did identify helping 
documents that are explicitly or indirectly linked to the policies, listed here in the form (number of 
explicit links : number of implicit links): Facebook (11:26), Orkut (8:25), Myspace (3:14), Zynga 
(3:4), Playfish (4:0). When necessary, we included references to those helping documents. Finally, we 
used the TAMS Analyzer (Tams 2008) to analyze frequencies of codes, relationships and resulting 
hierarchies among codes. 
3 ANALYSIS OF SNS PRIVACY POLICIES 
 
Figure 1 Final Template of high-level codes and the five main topics 
Based on the final version of our template, seen in Figure 1, we grouped sets of related codes from all 
SNS privacy policies into 5 topics. The figure also includes high-level code counts. In the following, 
we will describe our findings for four of the main topics. We do not discuss minors and underage users 
as this is a topic in itself that is not only about privacy but also about the relationship between parents 
and children, children and their peers, children and educational institutions, etc. Much work has been 
done on the topic of minors by Danah Boyd (Boyd 2007), among others.  
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Stakeholders in SNS privacy policies: A stakeholder can be defined as any individual, group, or 
organization whose actions can influence or be influenced by the development and use of the system 
whether directly or indirectly (Pouloudi 1999). According to this definition, parents, privacy 
initiatives, schools, businesses whose employees use SNS, institutions that offer trust seals, legislators 
and many others are also stakeholders of SNS.  
Parents are mentioned in all three documents as playing an important role for supporting safe internet 
practices of minors and underage users but are out of the scope of our analysis. The TrustE seal is 
mentioned as a stakeholder in the Facebook Privacy Policy. The US Safe Harbor Principles as agreed 
on between the EU and the USA are mentioned in all three policies.  
The focus of this study is on privacy policies and hence we limit our stakeholders to those either 
mentioned or addressed in these documents: the SNS itself, the registered users of an SNS, the readers 
of the privacy policy, and third parties. Third Parties in SNS are divided into three groups: third party 
advertisers, third party partners (including partners and affiliates), and TPAs.  
3.1 Topic 1: Personal Information, Data Protection and Policy: 
The first topic is concerned with the definition and scope of the policy and explanations of how the 
policy applies data protection principles to personal information. This topic is closely related to Topic 
2 with regards to data collection and processing for advertisement and by third parties.  
The main audience of all three privacy policies are registered users, while subtleties in the definitions 
of the audience exist. Facebook commences the privacy policy by addressing a "you" that is 
supposedly the user who voluntarily shares information with the SNS, both Myspace and Orkut start 
by defining when the policy start applying to its reader. Moreover, Myspace makes the distinction 
between members and visitors, hence suggesting that the policy also applies to the visitors of the site. 
Although Facebook talks about test rides for visitors that can take a peek into the social network, it is 
not clear if the Facebook Privacy Policy applies to them.  
A definition of the "user" is provided only later in the Facebook Privacy Policy after a first section that 
alludes to a caring relationship between Facebook and its users. This introduction enunciates the 
importance of sharing information on Facebook and the provider’s helper role in the process of 
sharing. Although much of the Facebook policy is about the collection and processing of a wide range 
of personal information by Facebook and third parties, the privacy problem is defined as something 
else.  
According to the Facebook Privacy Policy, privacy is a matter of controlling personal information that 
users willingly and knowingly choose to put on Facebook. Control is defined as the user’s ability to 
control accessibility of personal information to other users. A small number of exceptions apply to 
controlling information processed by the SNS itself and third parties. Therefore, privacy on Facebook 
is not about what Facebook itself can do with the information it collects, processes and shares with 
Third parties.  
In comparison, Myspace and Orkut's privacy policies are more functional and are concentrated on 
making transparent their data practices. Both policies do not provide users with definitions of privacy; 
the word privacy is never mentioned in the main text of the Orkut Privacy Policy. Rather, they 
describe if and how the providers apply subsets of the data protection principles. In that sense, these 
two policies are predominantly about defining the conditions with respect to personal information 
between a single user and the provider of the SNS. Both, Myspace and Orkut mention functionality to 
control sharing among users, but this is not the dominant theme in their privacy policies.  
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PersonalInfo: Content name, email, telephone number, address, 
gender, schools attended, any other personal or 
preference information, photos
PersonalInfo: Traffic all interactions with website
Other browser type and IP address, deidentified 
information, aggregated data, communication 
content and conditions of invitations to non-
facebook users, responses to invitations, 
information about the user from other sources, 
other users supplement to user's profile, 
activity information collected from third parties, 
information collected through cookies and 
beacons by third parties
PII name, email, mailing address, telephone 
number, credit card number
Non-PII date of birth, interests, hobbies, lifestyle 
choices, groups with whom they are affiliated 
(schools, companies), videos and/or pictures, 
private messages, bulletins or personal 
statements, IP address, aggregate user data, 
and browser type
Other marital status, education, number of children, 
about me section, interests, movies, 
anonymous click stream, number of page views 
calculated by pixel tags, aggregated 
demographic information,  information collected 
through cookies and beacons by third parties
Personalinfo email address, password, gender, age, 
occupation, hobbies, interests, photos
Other  communication content and conditions of 
invitations to non-Orkut users,  SMS 
communication content and conditions, user's 
wireless carrier
Facebook
Myspace
Orkut
 
Figure 2 Categorization of the policies of the data collected in each SNS. 
The definition of personal information plays an important role in articulating the scope of the privacy 
policies. Figure 2 shows the different categories of personal information used by the privacy policies, 
the data that is explicitly classified under each category, and the data that is mentioned in the policies 
but is not explicitly classified under a given category. We listed such data in the rows labeled "other" 
for each privacy policy. 
We note here a difference between the US definition of personally identifiable information (PII) 
(Office of Management and Budget 2007), and the EU's broader definition of personal data. While PII 
covers data that directly identifies an individual e.g., name, social security number, the EU Directive 
95/46/EC provides a much broader and vague definition of personal data. For computer scientists, this 
includes de-identified personal information through which individuals can be identified 
probabilistically: 
Myspace's privacy policy refers to the US definition of PII whereas Google and Facebook define a 
larger set of data as personal information, more close to the EU Directive’s definition. Any options 
Myspace offer to users are mainly about the protection of the PII. Given the limited scope of PII as 
defined above, Myspace can share almost all other profile information uploaded by the users with to 
third parties without apprehension. 
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In Orkut, personal information includes all the profile content but traffic data is not explicitly 
classified as personal information. Orkut does document their extensive collection of their users' traffic 
data which includes the content and conditions of all communications with non-Orkut users. 
Facebook has an even broader definition of personal information. It is the only privacy policy that 
explicitly makes a distinction between the personal information provided by the user, which we coded 
as PersonalInfo:Content, and "Web Site use information collected by us as you interact with our Web 
Site" which we coded as PersonalInfo:Traffic. Facebook offers users privacy controls only with 
respect to their PersonalInfo:Content and not with respect to their traffic data. Hence, traffic data is 
rendered as being outside of the privacy concerns and control of users.  
Further, Facebook explicitly states that it collects information about its users from other sites in order 
to offer users a personalized experience. Users are able to opt-out of the collection of data from other 
sources. But, there are no statements about the users' ability to access, edit or delete information 
previously collected.  
In all three privacy policies, anonymized or de-identified data is described as being data that cannot be 
linked back to the original users. It is not described how far the SNS go with de-identification, whether 
they make use of state of the art privacy preserving data mining techniques, whether they update these 
techniques as proofs of their vulnerability are made public, and whether they deal with the 
anonymization of network structures that have proven to be difficult (Narayanan and Shmatikov 
2009). 
“Accessing and editing personal data” is mentioned by all three privacy policies, however, only 
Myspace (ironically, the site which least requires users to input the “real” information) makes 
guarantees with respect to accuracy of personal information. 
The policies mention a number of possibilities to opt out of a subset of the data collection and 
processing activities indicated in the policies. These possibilities are always coupled with third party 
applications and data collection practices, the only exceptions being email notifications and Facebook 
Beacon.  
All three sites state that they may not be able to secure the users’ data, that data may become public, 
and that they are not accountable for such leakages. Facebook states that they may constrain the use of 
personal information by Third parties through agreements but they are not responsible for resulting 
breaches.  
Such statements can be interpreted in two ways. Either as a sign of honesty, given digital systems, the 
nature of the Internet and the security problems therein, any security or privacy mechanisms are 
subject to threats due to conditions that the providers themselves do not always control. Or as a means 
of freeing all three data collectors from accountability for the massive databases that they are running.  
Facebook explicitly makes no guarantees with respect to TPA providers’ privacy compliance, while 
Myspace and Google state that the agreements include agreements with respect to necessary security 
measures for the shared information.  
Both peer-to-peer add-ons and encryption could offer more secure alternatives with the same 
functionalities to SNS, none of the three SNS offer such mechanisms to secure sensitive or other 
information belonging to their users. Facebook and Orkut do mention the use of SSL for some of their 
communication, whereas we found no mention of such technologies in Myspace.  
Description of data retention practices in all three policies does not contain time limitations. Facebook 
and Orkut state that the retention of data is necessary to provide the SNS services. It is also not clear if 
this unspecified "reasonable period of time" also applies to the traffic data.  
Deletion should terminate data retention, but all of the policies make a distinction between deletion 
and deactivation, state that traces may be left on back up devices or mirror servers, and make it costly 
to delete the profile. The policies again do not state if deletion also applies to traffic data. Myspace 
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does not explicitly state what happens to non-PII when a user deletes her account. Further, it states that 
PII necessary for federal, state or local law will also be retained. It is unclear how much of the small 
set of PII needs to be retained according to federal, state or local law. All policies state something 
similar. None of the policies offer to notify the users with respect to breach of data, delivery of data 
for legal purposes, or sharing with third parties.  
Orkut provides a two-step explanation of profile deletion that leaves the reader perplexed. According 
to these descriptions, logging in after deletion may re-activate the user’s account. Further complete 
deletion is only possible if the user deletes all Google related accounts. This is a high price to pay to 
achieve the complete deletion of a profile on one of the Google services. 
3.2 Topic 2: Advertisement and Third Parties 
All privacy policies describe the SNS' sharing practices with third parties. There are four types of data 
sharing statements that are mentioned: (1) sharing profile information with third parties, (2) collecting 
information from Third Parties, (3) SNS providers blocking access to certain information with Third 
Parties, and (4) users revealing information to third parties directly. Third parties are either advertisers, 
search engines, subcontractors for the services offered by the SNS, third party sites that are linked 
through the SNS, or legally defined third parties (government agencies, law enforcement, or any 
subjects with a legitimate legal request for data).  
Facebook states that it shares de-identified information with advertisers and offers customized ads 
based on user behaviour. Facebook does not offer any option for users to opt-out of such a customized 
advertisement program, while both Myspace and Orkut do. Myspace depends on the veritability of the 
Network Advertising Initiative's Opt-Out program. Orkut lists only Predicta and Double Click as 
advertisement partners with the ability to opt-out. For the Predicta site we were unable to find an opt-
out option. Orkut offers no opt-out from the collection of communication content of SMS.  
Facebook explicitly states that it collects information about its users from third party sites. Although 
by now it is common to get access to users web based address books, none of the policies mentioned 
this sensitive aspect in their privacy policies.  
Further, the address book imports and collection (or scraping) of data from third party sites, practices 
that SNS admit to themselves, have led to a series of yet unresolved lawsuits about data portability and 
user lock-in. It is interesting that these lawsuits are being challenged as a matter of "Terms of Use" and 
not as a matter of privacy and related policies (Techcrunch a, 2009). Facebook states that it will 
discard data collected from third party sites if the users opts out, meaning that the information is 
collected even if the user opts-out, to be discarded afterwards.  
All three SNS mention that users may share information with third parties directly, if they install 
TPAs, follow links to other sites, or receive advertisements. All SNS do not take responsibility for 
information collected by the TPAs and instead, advise the users to read their privacy policies. Orkut 
explains that TPAs receive all public profile information, which is defined to include all content that is 
not set to a limited circle of friends. The application also receives information about other pages that 
the user visits (given the application is also installed there). The user's information becomes visible to 
users of the application on other sites.  
TPAs do not contain privacy policies on their SNS-based information pages. Therefore, users are left 
to their own device for locating these privacy policies, discovering which terms apply to their use of 
the application in the specific SNS and making an informed decision about their privacy. 
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3.3   Topic 3: User Control of Information:  
Sharing in SNS includes the right to own one's own information and control with whom to share 
information. Hence, Facebook provides users with privacy settings in order to control their sharing. 
But what control, ownership and sharing means are constrained by all SNS providers. 
The controls that users are given for their profile information applies at a maximum to: limiting search 
and access to profile information by other users; limiting access to third parties, and disabling indexing 
of profiles by third party search engines. With the exception of email notifications and Beacon, all 
three sites offer no controls with respect to data that is uploaded to the SNS itself. No mechanisms are 
provided to the users to keep any of their information confidential from the SNS.  
In that sense, in their privacy policies the SNS flaunt themselves as trusted. Users should be concerned 
about controlling their information with respect to other users and third parties. With the SNS 
themselves such controls are not necessary and are not provided. This contrasts with the accountability 
guarantees that the SNS provide their users: all SNS state in their privacy policies that they are not 
responsible for any security breaches and public leakages of data. 
By limiting the scope of the controls, not only do the SNS not step up to being accountable for the data 
they hold in their databases, they also construct the user as the figure responsible for making the right 
privacy decisions and controlling access to their own profile information. The users are the ones that 
choose to provide their information, they use the site at their own risk and they have to decide set their 
controls towards others.  
And yet this choice and control ends already with traffic data: revelation of traffic data is not 
information that a user ``knowingly chooses" to provide the SNS, nevertheless, they have no controls 
over it. 
In comparison, the "choices" made by the SNS and Third Parties are depicted in privacy policies as a 
matter of fact, a necessity for better services, and a description of practice. The SNS determine the 
boundaries of the choices that users make and may even override these. Even further, the underlying 
design is set up such that users may override other user’s choices with respect to controlling their 
profile information, if it conflicts with their desire to share information. The fact that one user's 
decision to share information with TPAs determines what happens with their friends' data further 
exacerbates the problem of addressing data sharing and control decisions as a matter of individual 
choice.  
3.4 Topic 4: User Interactions and Information 
SNS are designed to enhance sharing based on relationships between users and a number of features 
that broadcast information to (subsets of) these relationships. SNS work with transitive access control 
models where related users may be granted access rights and control rights i.e., the ability to 
dynamically extend the access list for one piece of information. For example, if a piece of information 
is accessible to friends-of-friends, then that means that friends of the user co-determine who is allowed 
on the access control list by virtue of defining their own set of friends. When a relationship is 
established between two users, both have control permissions on the relationship information itself: 
they can both delete the relationship and make its presence accessible to their choice of friends. We 
call any information in an SNS that can be controlled by more than one user relational information. 
Relational information is not an exception in SNS but rather the rule: photos are commented by others, 
walls are written on by many, discussions have many participants. “Other users may supplement your 
profile”, states Facebook. Hence, if a user wants to share their information, it is possible that 
supplements to that user's profile by others will also be shared. Hence, the concept of individually 
controlling data towards other users is intrinsically bound to fail.  
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Depending on the underlying design, those friends may then make that information accessible to a 
greater public. This points to an unresolved contradiction between the fact that the SNS are platforms 
for sharing; the design is optimized for sharing collectively, and the fact that privacy related controls 
are designed for individual users. The controls set by individual users may become meaningless and 
provide no more guarantees as soon as information is shared with or controlled by one or more users. 
None of the SNS take responsibility for information that becomes public as a result of their underlying 
design or give a reasonable description of how it works.  
The ability to only individually control a limited amount of personal information coupled with the 
hands-off attitude of SNS providers with respect to information belonging to many suggests that the 
privacy policies and controls they offer only effectively apply to data that is not shared and is related 
to a single user. This is in most cases is limited to the persons contact information and personal 
attributes. Any other settings to control information may be overridden by the underlying design and 
this is not the responsibility of the SNS.  
 
Being able to control private attributes has recently been questioned. Studies have shown that 
attributes revealed by friends in a profile's vicinity might be used to infer confidential attributes 
(Zheleva & Getoor 2009) cautioning about revelations of networks. Against this type of thinking, 
Stalder (2002) argues that in a networked world the intrinsic attributes of individuals are less valuable 
than being able to prove that a user is well networked. It is the connectedness and being able to prove 
their “existence” that allows individuals access to communities and organizations. 
Hence, although the revelation of hidden personal attributes is a problem, we conclude that the privacy 
policies attention to individual control of private attributes and not much more does disservice to the 
importance of relational information and collective sharing in a networked world.  
Myspace's privacy policy is less concerned with justification of the sharing practices, although they 
also explain that making profiles accessible through search engines and browsing is important to 
connecting members. Orkut uses a similar language, states that privacy controls may be overridden by 
the decisions of other users, and takes no responsibility.  
Relational information also causes problems with the deletion of data. It is not clear which information 
will be deleted when users terminate their accounts. In Orkut there are dozens of help pages for the 
different deletion options. None of these are mentioned or linked on the page for deleting profiles. In 
some cases, users may also delete contributions made by others: community owners are able to delete 
all comments from single users; a photo owner is able to delete comments to her photos and on her 
wall or comments she left on other users' walls. Deletion of relational information can be about both 
the privacy of a user or the integrity of a user's profile or a community's discussion forum. 
The differences in opinion as to which of privacy and integrity is of higher priority may lead to 
conflicts. Neither the design nor the privacy policies address potential conflicts arising out of 
relational information removal. They also do not offer the possibility to negotiate or notify users when 
deletion is desired or unwanted deletion occurs. Only Facebook addresses that disputes may arise, but 
what kind of disputes, if they also include disputes among users is unclear.  
4 PRIVACY POLICIES OF 3RD PARTY APP PROVIDER 
In addition to analyzing the privacy policies of SNS, we decided to study two of the largest providers 
of TPAs, Zynga (a San Francisco based company) and Playfish (London based). Between the two of 
them, these providers are responsible for more than 10 of the top (mostly games) third party 
applications on Facebook and other SNS (Gamasutra, 2009). 
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InfoMgmt 3 Data Protection 42
PrivacyMarketing 3 PersonalInfo 10
Control 2 Tracking 6
PrivacySettings 1 Aggregation 5
PrivacyCompliance 5
Definition 4
Questions 3
Subtotal 9 Subtotal 75
otherUsers 2 AdvertisementPractices 5
ThirdPartyAgreements 3
Applications 3
LinksToThirdPartySites 2
Misappropriation 1
Subtotal 2 Subtotal 14
Minors 1
InternetSafety 1
Subtotal 2
Total Number of Codes 102
Internet Safety, Minors, Underage 
Users
User Control of Information
Personal Information, Data 
Protection and Policy Definition
User Interactions and Information Advertisement and Third Parties
 
Figure 3 Final Template of high-level codes and the five main topics 
We will again describe our findings for the main template topics. The policies of Zynga and Playfish 
are brief, however they do offer a different angle from which to study privacy policies. 
 The privacy policies here also list the user and the provider as clear stakeholders. In addition to SNS, 
advertising partners, 3rd party content providers, partners, affiliates and the users' contacts on the SNS 
themselves.  
Parents of minors and legal bodies are also mentioned, as are certain legislations. As these are not 
discussed in detail, they do not play a large role in our analysis here. 
Stakeholders in TPA privacy policies: The stakeholders mentioned in TPA privacy policies are as 
follows: the TPA itself, the registered users of a TPA, the readers of the privacy policy, and third 
parties. Third Parties in TPA are third party advertisers, third party partners (including partners and 
affiliates), other TPAs, and additional third parties called content providers. 
 
4.1 Topic 1: Personal Information, Data Protection and Policy: 
Both providers start by identifying their sites and the documents. Playfish continues by immediately 
mentioning their compliance with data protection legislation (Data Protection Act, 1998) this is later 
somewhat negated by the fact that user information might be transferred outside of Europe where 
similar legislation might not exist (section 4). Zynga, on the other hand, starts by assuring the user that 
their information privacy is important, and that the service is designed to protect that information from 
misappropriation. They explicitly mention Californian law’s protection of opt-out right from 
disclosing information to third parties. Furthermore, Zynga confirms that they use SSL (Secure Socket 
Layer) technology for processing sensitive information. Playfish states that they have “implemented 
reasonable technical and organisational measures dedicated to secure your personal […]”. Those 
measures are not explicitly discussed, and this statement is immediately followed by a disclaimer that 
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the internet is an open system, and that they cannot guarantee that unauthorised third parties will not 
be able to defeat those measures and misappropriate users' personal information. Playfish uses an 
unidentified third party for payment processing. We will discuss third parties in section 5.2. 
Both providers dedicate sections to the collection and processing of personal information. Users are 
told that they consent to the collection of their personal information by using the service on Zynga, 
and that they reserve the right to retain all that information, “in anonymous form” for as long as they 
see fit. Playfish makes no mention of consent on a global level, they do however mention consent with 
regards to transfer of personal information outside of Europe. 
In addition to basic personal data that both services collect on registration, SNS accounts (such as 
Facebook IDs) are gathered when users use applications on those SNS. Remarkably, Zynga states that 
the IDs are also collected if a user uses the app on a contact's SNS page. No further information is 
given at this point, particularly, there is no mention made of what exactly constitutes "usage" in this 
case. This confirms, to a certain extent, the privacy breach identified by Guerses et. Al (2008), that 
TPAs have access not only to their users' accounts, but also to those of the users' friends. At this point, 
Zynga points users towards the ToS and PPs of SNS providers for more information. 
Both providers, as in most other PPs that we have studied, discuss the user’s responsibility to read 
changes to the policies, inform the user about their information moving to new owners in case of a 
change of ownership, and about the fact that they may gather information about the user from various 
sources. 
With regards to legal bodies, Zynga states that they may access, preserve and disclose information as 
they see fit in order to avoid liability or when required to do so by law. Playfish does not mention this 
particular topic. Zynga additionally states that they may maintain and/or delete information as they see 
fit, particularly if such content constitutes an infringing or prohibited posting. 
Activity tracking, and particularly the usage of cookies, is given major coverage on Playfish. Almost a 
third of the policy is dedicated to explaining what cookies are, and how playfish uses them. The 
provider identifies two types of cookies, those issued by Playfish itself, and those issued by third party 
advertisers. For the latter, Playfish clearly states that they have neither access to, nor control of the 
cookies. Furthermore, the provider informs users about their ability to disable cookies, with the notice 
that not all features of the service may be available in the case of disabled cookies. Zynga also 
mentions both cookies placed by other content providers since “most content delivered through Zynga 
games originates with another content provider”. No further mention of how and what information is 
gathered here, who those “content providers” are, and how users can get to the bottom of this chain of 
responsibility can be discerned from the policy. 
Both providers discuss newsletters and other forms of notifications sent to users. Playfish mentions an 
opt-in system whereby users request certain newsletters, whereas Zynga says that they offer an 
unsubscribe link in the case of emails. They however state that they may use “your name, email 
address and other information on our system to notify you of [...]”. What that "other information" is, 
and how users can opt-out of receiving notifications through those channels is not made clear. 
4.2 Topic 2: Advertisement and Third Parties: 
After data collection, retention and processing, advertisements and third parties make up the second 
largest data body in both policies.  Sharing information with third party content providers, advertisers 
and others is mentioned regularly throughout, and the line between data anonymization, aggregation, 
mining, as well as PII and non-PII is very blurred. In this section we will dissect that information and 
try to clarify what type of information is shared with whom, according to the privacy policies. 
Playfish informs users that they may use targeted/behavioral advertising, but issues an assurance that 
the advertisers will not receive information regarding who views those advertisements. They do, 
however, mention passing along activity information to third parties in order to improve the service. 
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That information is, however, aggregated data and statistics which can not be used to identify 
individual users. 
In both policies, a differentiation is made regarding third party advertising companies. Those may 
place cookies and use pixel tags (or beacons) in the advertisements. The providers do not claim any 
responsibility for information gathered through these cookies or tags. Additionally, Zynga mentions 
that, even though they do not provide any PII to these advertisers, information is sent when a user 
views a targeted add, and the advertiser may then conclude that the user has the characteristics (age, 
gender, etc) which that ad was targeting. 
This information conflicts with the statements made in another section, that Zynga DOES provide 
non-PII and certain technical information (including IP and activity information) to its partners 
(including advertisers). However, the partners have no independent right to further share that 
information. Zynga also states that users may not opt-out of sharing that information “whether 
personally identifiable information or other information”. Suddenly, there is mention of PII, which 
wasn't the case before. Particularly since, only a few paragraphs before that statement, Zynga clearly 
states “We do not sell or rent your "Personally Identifiable Information to any third party. We may, 
however, use certain information about you that is not personally”. This whole section starts to 
contradict itself, and does not offer a coherent statement to the user, with all the conflicting statements 
regarding sharing, renting and selling, as well as PII, non-PII and activity information. Someone who 
studies the section in detail, let alone a casual reader, is left confused and not really aware of what 
their rights are. 
Both providers do not explicitly mention security practices, rather, Playfish issues an assurance to the 
user: “In some cases, the third party may receive your information. However, at all times, we will 
control and be responsible for the use of your information.” This claim of responsibility is quite 
unusual, and does not appear in any of the other policies we analysed. However, Playfish does not 
really explain what that “responsibility” really entails in terms of accountability. Zynga simply claims 
that certain of its partners, their contractors and employees may view user information and perform the 
various tasks (as set forth in the Privacy Policy). 
4.3 Topic 3: User Control of Information: 
There are interesting points to be made regarding control of information on both services. Playfish 
offers users the chance to request to see the information available about them (for a fee of 10 GBP). 
There is no specification regarding what that information exactly is, whether it includes relational 
information, or information gathered from other sources. One caveat is the providers' right to withhold 
access to that information where that right is provided under data protection legislation. Users may 
review, correct, update or change their personal information by directly contacting Playfish. There is 
no mention of allowing users to complete delete their information. Zynga, on the other hand, makes no 
mention of allowing users to view or change their information. They do state that any interactions and 
content sent through the service may be collected and used by unspecified "others"! Account 
termination is explicitly mentioned here, but again with the caveat that information available on users 
may be retained even after said termination. 
4.4 Topic 4: User Interactions and Information: 
Users of Zynga may invite other people to join the service, or to deliver information to users through 
SNS apps offered by Zynga. Zynga reserves the right to retain and disclose that information to legal 
bodies, as well as to send invitations and reminders to those users. Recipients have the right to opt-out 
of receiving further invitations. There is no mention of this in Playfish's privacy policy. 
In conclusion, Zynga's Privacy Policy is much more detailed and comprehensive than that of Playfish, 
however, they tend to offer fewer rights to the users, and make more use of data mining and 
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information aggregation and sharing for various purposes. Playfish assumes a more reassuring, user-
friendly tone, but on the downside, offers a more vague document that leaves many topics (ex: account 
termination) untouched. Both providers share information with numerous unspecified partners, 
associates and content providers. The extent of the information shared, and who the recipients of that 
information are must be made available to users, at the least. 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The objectives that these privacy policies fulfil are unclear. Based on the section titles, the policies 
read as attempts to document how the data is collected and processed according to principles of data 
protection. But the policies don’t provide proper guarantees on data security or on the privacy controls 
offered through the privacy tools, share data extensively with third parties and offer few possibilities 
for users to negotiate what data is collected and disseminated. 
The way privacy related information is not concentrated in one central document or location but are 
spread over several related documents across websites of SNS and TPA provider’s, their partners, and 
unidentified others makes it nearly impossible for users to have a comprehensive overview of their 
privacy information. Users are left with the grand responsibility of controlling their “personal 
information”, while the rules of the game are determined by those who collect information and can 
juggle data protection compliant privacy policies in such a way that they offer no accountability for 
their actions. 
SNS and TPA providers tend to play a game of ping-pong, volleying user data to each other and trying 
to absolve themselves of responsibility. 3rd party providers state that they gather information from their 
users’ SNS accounts. Neither stakeholder specifies the extent of that information. The SNS providers 
state that users are agreeing to the 3rd party’s policies when they add an application while the 3rd 
parties state that user information on SNS is governed by the SNS’ policies. Users can easily get lost 
in a maze of privacy policies.  
Further, in none of the SNS do users have access to their traffic data, this also holds for Zynga. 
Playfish offers users access to all the information held about them, although it is not clear if that 
includes traffic data. None of the policies offer users a means of finding out when their personal 
information has been subpoenaed or forwarded to other parties. How relational information behaves 
often remains a mystery, since it does not easily fit into the personal information cast. Under these 
conditions, access rights prove to be a weakness of SNS and TPA. This is a surprising result given that 
SNS are about users feeding and accessing profile information. 
Based on our previous studies, we know that when it comes to privacy concerns users do not use the 
same vocabulary or make the same distinctions as the data protection principles. Facebook was the 
only provider that tried to address user concerns with their language, but they also managed to 
maximize and legitimize their interests in their privacy policy. It is important to study if and how user 
concerns can be addressed by data protection, and which issues remain untouched by privacy 
legislation and recommendations. 
Paradoxically, in the case of the SNS policies that we studied, data protection leads towards reducing 
privacy, rather than protecting it. This paradox is mainly attributed to these principles reflecting a 
procedural approach to maximizing individual control over data thus placing the burden of protection 
to the individual rather than society and its institutions (Cate, 2006). SNS and TPA providers have 
successfully taken advantage of this weakness. 
At the same time, it seems that social networks inherent structure of sharing has provided alternative 
approaches to privacy concerns: the ability to collectively respond to privacy breaches as an SNS 
community. This was best observed through user reactions to Beacon and Facebook’s Terms of Use 
(Rizk et al. 2009). This could be a cue that instead of focusing on individualized and proceduralized 
solutions to privacy concerns, we should think about collective forms which increase users awareness 
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of existing information practices and allow them to determine or negotiate how their information is 
collected, retained, distributed or deleted. This may lead to other concerns like ownership of relational 
information, indeterminate visibility, and community accountability that the privacy debate and 
policies have so far rarely addressed. 
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